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Introduction
This paper examines the conventional wisdom that globalization will undermine the ability of national governments to set economic and social policy. More Developing countries view this argument as disguised protectionism and as being equally unfair as it will erode their competitiveness, which is largely based on labor costs.
While this issue has been extensively analyzed in a North-South framework, its importance has been overlooked among developed nations that are characterized by similar political systems, and that are part of regional trade agreements. Furthermore, and on a more pragmatic note, the EU has been in existence for enough years: the availability of reliable data, both cross-section and time series, makes empirical analysis possible. Regarding labor standards themselves, the EU has traditionally tried to ensure a "decent" working environment throughout member countries, by setting some common minimum rules on working conditions, and promoting a safe and healthy work environment, but leaving some room for preservation of policy independence and diversity (Gitterman 2003) .
In this paper, we follow the OECD (1996) and define labor standards as norms, rules and conventions that govern working conditions and industrial relations. Such a definition captures all the institutional elements of labor markets such as minimum wages, occupational health and safety standards, number of hours worked, rates of occupational injuries, and unionization rates. 2 One would presumably expect labor standards to be a driven by both a country's level of development and its respect for international conventions defined by the ILO that it has ratified. Ultimately, the choice of a particular standard is a domestic policy choice, which suggests to us as economists that diversity of standards should be the norm rather than the exception. The theory of commercial policy proposes that gains from trade arise from diversity, and that an enforced harmonization or "straitjacketing" of countries to a particular standard, whether higher or lower than would have been chosen otherwise, will generally be harmful to welfare. 3 Hence, the argument that countries should restrict access to markets when there are suspicions that products are being made under poor working conditions is one that needs to be dealt with caution.
This paper thus seeks to answer two questions related to the issue of economic integration and labor standards. First, the paper tries to ascertain empirically whether countries with high labor standards experience a loss of competitiveness measured by export performance; in other words, to what extent are trade flows determined by labor standards when one controls for natural determinants of comparative advantage. The conventional wisdom argues that countries with lower labor standards should enjoy a better export performance; this should be even more felt in the case of labor-intensive production and exports. Second, the paper examines the "race to the bottom" argument that low labor standards provide an unfair source of comparative advantage, and that increasing imports from low-standards countries will have an adverse impact on wages and working conditions in high-standards countries. With the free movement of capital, the argument runs, new capital investment will flow to regions where labor standards are lower, and wages cheaper, therefore placing downward pressure on domestic standards as erstwhile high-standard countries ratchet standards downward in order to remain competitive. This argument, however, is a theoretical possibility, not an empirical necessity, and in need of further investigation. In so doing, we will address the issue of convergence or harmonization of standards across countries as a result of increased economic integration.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly surveys the history of labor standards in the European Union. Section 3 discusses existing theoretical and empirical work. Section 4 presents the models tested and empirical evidence related to the two questions outlined in the previous paragraph. Section 5 concludes.
Labor Standards in the European Union -A Brief History 4
International labor standards as we know them today originate from the aftermath of the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain at the beginning of the 19 th century. Attempts were made to offset the negative externalities associated with industrialization in order to protect members of the working class and these were generally met by opposition from employers even though there were benefits (arguably) accruing to the latter. 5 Standards pertaining to minimum age and maximum hours worked were thus applied to women and children as they were believed to be unable to decide for themselves, had very few (if any) political rights and were typically not members of bargaining units. Historians of labor standards refer to the English Factory Act of 1802 introduced by Sir Robert Peel as the starting point, which set limits on hours of work and asked that education and religious instruction be provided to apprentices. Subsequent legislation in the 19 th century expanded coverage and requirements.
Over the course of the 19 th century, most European nations had standards in place for factory labor, and at least initially, they established their own standards independently of one another. Colonies were, however, excluded from these regulations.
Parallel to this evolution of national labor standards, there were some attempts to establish international labor standards as well. As discussed in Engerman (2003) , there were concerns about the costs that a country would have to face if it unilaterally set standards for itself and the resulting loss in competitiveness; some also argued in favor of international demonstrates that this result arises from second-best considerations (adjusting the stringency of standards serves as a proxy for a tariff), and that the first-best optimum is characterized by diversity of standards. Since the Maastricht Treaty retained the provisions in previous treaties, members were still in control of their own right to pay, right to association, and right to strike or impose lockouts.
The Amsterdam Treaty, which came into force in 1999, now allows qualified majority voting in some additional issues (but the rights to association, strike and lockouts are still excluded).
Even though the dominant view in the 1990s was that integration could only go forward 7 with harmonization of labor and good markets regulation, some countries (the UK and Portugal namely) called for more labor market flexibility.
At the 2000 European Council meeting in Nice, a European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights was signed, but as it stands, these rights are principles rather than binding rights. In short, one can argue that EU member states do not harmonize labor standards, even though they seem to agree on the lowest common denominator of standards. Even though the EU sets minimum standards, countries have retained most of their policy autonomy and diversity. EU policy pertaining to labor standards remains noninterventionist, despite the fact that the European Commission has more powers to intervene. Section 4 of the paper will examine the empirical evidence regarding this issue.
Before conducting our empirical analysis, we will review some of the important existing work in this area in the next section.
Literature Review: Theoretical and Empirical
Theoretical work linking international trade with labor standards is relatively scarce. The classic early studies, for instance by Johnson (1969) and Brecher (1974a and 1974b) , considered minimum wages and their welfare implications but did not consider other internationally accepted labor standards such as the number of hours worked, the freedom from forced labor or unionization. On the other hand, Alam (1992) , in an unpublished doctoral dissertation, was one of the first to provide a more general framework for the economic analysis of the impact of labor standards, at constant goods prices, on a country's comparative advantage within the framework of a two-country, two-commodity, two-factor model. results indicate that countries can benefit or be hurt by a labor standard depending, first, on whether the latter is imposed in their import or export sector, and, second, on the relative factor intensity of the traded goods sector. More importantly, their model predicts that in the absence of coordination, countries will tend to underprovide or overprovide a standard, thus failing to reach a world optimum in the presence of trade. However, it does not generally follow that an enforced harmonization of standards will be welfare-improving for the world; indeed, the contrary result is more likely. The overall conclusion of the theoretical analyses outlined above is that diversity of labor standards between countries should be expected, and that such diversity need not be regarded as being unfair as long as labor standards are a result of an efficient allocation of resources.
Since the publication of the OECD (1996) study of Trade, Employment and Labor
Standards, a number of studies have examined the empirical relationship between trade and labor standards, namely whether countries with lower labor standards will tend to gain a comparative advantage in trade. The OECD (1996) study itself examined export performance for developed and developing countries versus freedom of association and collective bargaining rights as proxies for labor standards. Based mostly on "eyeballing"
scatterplots, but without a rigorous econometric analysis, it found no evidence that lowstandard countries enjoy a better export performance than high-standard countries. In another study, Krueger (2000) has examined the impact that the EU will have on the labor compact, 8 focusing in particular on the race to the bottom hypothesis that countries will have to lower their standards to maintain a competitive advantage in trade.
Overall, his results indicate that even though integration will cause some downward pressure on labor market protections (that is, looser regulation), this pressure will be modest, and
European nations will continue to maintain distinct labor practices as long as they are willing to bear the costs of these practices. Krueger gives several reasons why this should not come as a surprise. First, certain aspects of the labor compact can improve economic efficiency;
second, imperfect mobility of factor inputs and goods and services will tend to diminish the pressure placed on uncompetitive labor practices; and third, for political economy reasons, labor legislation within each country is a reflection of what the majority of the public wants.
Krueger considers labor mobility among EU countries and argues that it has not increased despite the removal of restrictions on labor mobility within the EU. Furthermore, considering immigration over the period 1980-1996, he finds that immigration from non-EU countries has declined since 1993 even though these countries are typically characterized by lower living standards and weak social protection. Recent migration data seems to indicate that this trend has reversed in the latter patter of the 1990s, with migration from non-EU countries on the rise (see Appendix A), while migration across the EU seems to be fairly FDI. The available empirical evidence to date indicates that this is not true and that the opposite is actually taking place (see for example, Rodrik (1996) ). 8 Krueger uses the term labor compact to capture the bargain among labor, capital and government, covering issues such as pay, social protection, union organization and safety standards.
stable. In our empirical analysis, we will take a systematic look at the race to the bottom hypothesis for a number of indicators of labor standards.
Description of the Data
Using All of the EU countries mentioned in our sample have ratified the eight core (fundamental) conventions on international labor standards. ILOLEX, which is a database of international labor standards from the ILO also provides information about the total number of conventions ratified by each country and the dates of ratification. Table 1 below summarizes the current situation. There is quite a range in the data with Spain having ratified the largest number and Austria the lowest (out of a possible 185 Conventions). Unlike previous studies, however, we do not use the above as an indication of existing standards since it is not possible to tell whether these conventions are in fact being enforced. Instead, we use several indicators for labor standards, which are described below. We consider total public social expenditure as a percentage of GDP, lsoc, from the OECD Social Expenditure Database as one of the indicators for labor standards. In the analysis of convergence of standards, we take into account some of its subdivisions as well, namely old-age expenditure and expenditure on unemployment (all as percentages of GDP).
Public social expenditure includes unemployment benefits and incapacity related benefits, which can be conceived as indicators of labor standards in a given country. All of the countries in our sample provide social protection such as pensions, unemployment benefits and income support schemes. We consider an overall index of labor market well-being from the Centre for the Study of Living Standards, denoted as lwell. We have data for the latter that covers the period 1980-2001 for nine countries in our sample. The index takes into account average returns from work, the aggregate accumulation of human capital, inequality in current returns from work, and insecurity in the anticipation of future returns from work. Trade union density rates, lunion, are also considered and they are obtained from the OECD Labor Market Statistics Database, which are based on surveys or administrative data.
We also have data on strikes and lockouts, lstr, for most of the countries over the period considered, which reflects the ability of workers to express their concerns. Finally, we consider occupational injuries, linj, in the manufacturing sector per thousand people employed or insured, which is an indicator of safety at the workplace. As one can imagine, none of these indicators are perfect but compared to ILO conventions (which are ratified but not necessarily enforced), our indicators measure actual labor regulations. 
Empirical Analysis

Labor Standards and Export Performance
As shown by Brown et al. (1996) and Dehejia and Samy (2004) , theoretically, a labor standard that uses some capital and labor (and is therefore an additional cost) may alter a country's comparative advantage depending on the factor intensity of the standard and factor endowments of the country (which in turn determine whether the country is an exporter or importer of the good affected by the standard). In a Heckscher-Ohlin framework, an increase in the labor force of a given labor-abundant country (due for example to a reduction in the minimum age for employment -which can be conceived as a decrease in labor standards), will increase production of the goods that use labor intensively, improving the country's comparative advantage in that good. 10 This will also change the terms of trade as a result of an increase in export supply and affect the terms of trade of the country's trading partner. It is possible to construct different scenarios that will indicate the trade and welfare effects of the standard, namely whether countries gain or lose from the imposition of standards.
Empirically, therefore, it is important to determine whether labor standards can affect comparative advantage and hence trade flows as measured by export performance. As seen in section 2 of the paper, studies that have examined this question have considered developing countries mostly and the empirical evidence is far from being conclusive.
Following Rodrik (1996) , Mah (1997) 
where is manufactured exports (lex) of country i at time t as a fraction of country i's merchandise exports at time t;
refers to a vector of variables that proxy for the natural determinants of comparative advantage; and refers to any of the proxies for labor standards outlined in the previous section. In particular, we will use the working-age population-to-land ratio (lpop) and average years of education of the working-age population
(lhuman) as our X's to proxy for the labor/land ratio and human capital respectively. Both of these variables are expected to be positively related to the dependent variable.
The maximum coverage in our data spans the period 1980-2001, and the maximum number of countries in our sample is fifteen, depending on data availability. In effect we
have an unbalanced panel since we do not have full observations for all countries. The functional form that we use is a log-linear version of the above general specification where all variables are measured in natural logarithms:
The country fixed effect is µ i and ε it is the normal disturbance term. The fixed effect model is normally preferred because it takes into account time-invariant unobservable country heterogeneity, which is possibly correlated with the dependent variable.
Furthermore, it is usually recommended when the number of groups (countries) is less than the number of time periods (years). However, a Hausman test was employed to compare the fixed and random effects estimates of coefficients and equation (1) estimated accordingly. One would expect, as the conventional wisdom holds, that low-standard countries will enjoy a better export performance than high-standard countries because of lower costs. In fact, as shown by Rodrik (1996) , labor standards are significant determinants of labor costs when allowance is made for productivity. There is also the possibility, however, that labor standards can improve the production process, encourage workers to perform better, and improve productivity. For example, providing workers with more safety at the workplace may induce them to perform better. The overall effect on export performance may therefore not be as clear as expected, and hence we have no a priori on the sign of β 2 . Tables 3-5 show the results when equation (2) Note: Robust t-statistics are shown in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%.
We recognize that not all the countries in our sample were members of the EU at the beginning of the sample period, even though they were part of other free trade arrangements. Estimating the equation for different time periods, to take into account the fact that some of the countries joined later, would have reduced the degrees of freedom considerably. Instead, we tried to capture these effects by using dummy variables for membership, which did not change the results reported here significantly. As we can see from table 3 However, only lhou confirms the conventional wisdom whereas lwell and lsoc point in the opposite direction. Note: Robust t-statistics are shown in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%.
Finally, table 5 above shows the results when the dependent variable, llabint, refers to labor intensive commodities as a percentage of GDP. In this case, the Hausman test favored a random effects model. The human capital variable is significant with the right sign in most regressions but the proxy for the labor/land ratio is not. As for the labor standard variables, lsoc and lunion are positive and significant, indicating that higher standards are in fact related to an improvement in exports of labor intensive goods, which is contrary to the 22 conventional wisdom. We also estimated equations with capital intensive manufactures as a percentage of GDP as our dependent variable (results not shown here). Not surprisingly, the human capital variable is highly significant (with t-statistics greater than 10 in most cases)
while the proxy for the labor/land ratio is less significant than in table 5 above. Two of the labor standards (lsoc and lwell) were in disagreement with the conventional wisdom while lhou and lstr confirmed it. 
Constant -11.678** -11.177** -12.491** -12.497** -13.549** -13.237** -13.071** (-13.315) (-6.482) (-13.032) (-11.632) (-13.849) (-11.979) (-13.980) Note: Robust t-statistics are shown in brackets. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%.
Overall, therefore, we obtain very mixed evidence regarding the conventional wisdom, but the fact remains that trade (export) performance is still primarily determined by relative factor endowments and not labor standards. Our results therefore confirm those of Rodrik (1996) and Dehejia and Samy (2004) , who used cross-sectional data for large samples consisting of both developed and developing countries. Since our primary interest was to consider the individual effects of standards, Tables 3-5 report results when one labor standard is introduced at a time. Considering all the indicators together reduces the degrees of freedom considerably, and one has to be mindful of multicollinearity among the standards. We have nonetheless tried this and it turns out that the results are not significantly altered when different combinations of standards are introduced 13 . Export performance continues to be determined by the natural determinants of comparative advantage, and we obtain mixed evidence regarding the conventional wisdom. As a further robustness check, we considered shorter time periods for our pooled data (and certain specific years at regular intervals pooled together); again, the overall results did not change significantly, even though we had fewer degrees of freedom.
Race to the Bottom?
Whether one looks at trade or foreign direct investment flows, it is quite obvious that the EU has been characterized by increased integration over the past two decades. This section addresses the issue that increased economic integration will restrict the ability of national governments to set independent policy choices, in our case, the choice over labor standards. The extreme version of this thesis, which we have alluded to in the introduction, is that governments will be forced into a "race to the bottom" in order to remain competitive. Following the seminal work of Viner (1950) , it is now widely agreed that the overall effects of removing trade barriers on welfare depends on the magnitudes of trade creation and diversion. The empirical literature which has tried to quantify these welfare effects has in general shown that trade creation dominates, in the case of the EU, such that welfare effects are positive overall (Lloyd 1992) . It can thus be expected that trade creation will improve working conditions as there is likely to be a positive relationship between working conditions and the level of economic development in the long run, since higher labor standards are presumably a "normal" good demand for which will rise with income.
Thus, to the extent that economic integration raises welfare, labor standards will improve over time. Further, even if some standards are low in a given country, this may not improve its competitiveness if other standards are higher; in other words, differences in labor standards across a given country may persist.
Even though integration is more likely to improve labor standards and welfare for participating members, the following possible costs of integration need to be taken into Finally, in order to belong to the EMU, countries must maintain low and stable debts, which may lead them to cut social expenditure. In sum, for all the reasons mentioned above, although economic integration may be expected to improve labor standards overall, the possibility of social dumping because of stronger international competition needs to be taken into account, and there is, in principle, ambiguity on the predicted sign and magnitude of the effect.
We therefore consider the evolution of labor standards in the EU over the years there is said to be σ-convergence; on the other hand, β-convergence refers to a situation in which the partial correlation between a given variable over time and its initial level is negative. 14 In this paper we explore whether or not σ-convergence in labor standards is occurring across EU member countries, as this is the germane definition for our purposes.
A cursory look at the data reveals a rather mixed picture. Table 5 below reports changes in (proxies for) labor standards over the past two decades. As can be seen, there have been considerable improvements in labor standards represented by the index of labor market well-being, total social spending, old age benefits, and safety at the workplace (occupational injuries). However, there have been declines in trade union density over the whole period and an increase in hours worked in the 1990s (even if not in all countries).
Overall, the results are not as grim as the conventional wisdom would have it; even though integration may impose constraints on domestic policy, they are evidently not as severe as the pessimists would have predicted. Source: authors' calculations based on available data for EU-15. The data is averaged over the relevant period before calculating percentage changes. The numbers in parenthesis refer to the number of countries in the sample that experienced increases (+) or decreases (-) in the relevant variable. convergence and σ-divergence. The problem, however, with the previous interpretation, is that it ignores changes in the means of the distributions, which is obvious from the numbers reported in Table 5 . As a result, we report coefficients of variation and interpret a fall in this variable as further evidence of σ-convergence. Once again, the evidence is mixed as we observe convergence in the index of labor market well-being, social spending (and its subcategories) and hours worked, and divergence for the others.
Conclusion
This paper has examined the effects of labor standards on export performance of countries that are part of the European Union by employing panel data over the period 1980 to 2001.
In so doing, we have tried to test the conventional wisdom that countries with lower labor standards will experience an improvement in export competitiveness. Our empirical estimates indicate some evidence in favor of the conventional wisdom, although overall labor standards appear to exert less of an influence on export performance than the traditional determinants of comparative advantage predicted by neoclassical trade theory. This is. in our view. a significant contribution to both the literature on economic integration in the EU, and on the competitive effects of labor standards in general, as the majority of empirical studies, cited in the introduction, use cross-sectional data and are perforce unable 29 to exploit movements in labor standards over time. Our study thus represents a substantial methodological improvement. We have also examined the issue of convergence of standards across countries to try to shed some light on the race to the bottom argument. Our results point towards convergence in some standards and divergence in others, suggesting that on this important question, the jury is still very much out.
In the European context, in recent years, there has been much discussion and a number of studies delving into the social consequences of EU enlargement, a natural question as the ten new members are at fairly different (and generally lower) levels of economic development compared to the EU-15 countries. It would be interesting to examine current and historical labor regulations in these countries, as well as trade flows to ascertain the veracity of the arguments linking trade and labor standards, as well as the race to the bottom hypothesis. There is, regrettably, as yet insufficient data to explore these hypotheses, given the very recent accession of the ten new members. Based on the results in this paper, however, we can conjecture that trade flows will continue to be determined mostly by the natural determinants of comparative advantage, and, looking at the current political economy, that countries will choose their own social policies (including labor standards) based mostly on domestic considerations. Formal tests of these conjectures await the advent of new data of sufficient quality and quantity.
In the context of the empirical trade literature, it would also be interesting to see
how, if at all, our results change when testing alternative trade models, such as the gravity model, with the different indicators of labor standards used in this paper, as well as disaggregated trade data for manufactured goods that takes into account skill intensity.
Furthermore, a systematic evaluation of β-convergence for standards would also allow us to 30 check whether the race to the bottom holds when other factors that affect standards are taken into account. All of these questions remain the subject of future research.
